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Standing Mute at Arrest as Evidence of Guilt: The "Right to 
Silence" Under Attack 
Frank R. Herrmann and Brownlow M. Speer∗
 
I.   The Right to Stand Mute When Arrested.      
          Dean Erwin Griswold suggested in 1955 that "the privilege against self-incrimination 
is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."1 Since that time, 
Miranda v. Arizona2 and its progeny have made the privilege effectively available to the 
ordinary person taken into custody and charged with crime. Miranda accomplishes this end 
by requiring that an arrested person be advised of the privilege against self-incrimination 
before being questioned by the police--in short, that the person has a right to remain silent 
and decline to answer questions.3 From the right to remain silent in the face of police 
questioning probably everyone instinctively understands that there is a right to be silent when 
arrested. The privilege against self-incrimination includes the right to stand "mute…in the 
face of accusation."4 An arrested person is "under no duty to speak."5 "At the time of 
                                                 
∗ Frank R. Herrmann is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
Brownlow M. Speer is the chief appellate attorney for the Massachusetts Committee for 
Public Counsel Services. 
1 ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955). 
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 "[W]hen an individual  is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by 
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning…[h]e must be 
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he 
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an 
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to 
any questioning if he so desires." Id. at 478-479. 
4 Id. at 468 n.37. 
5 United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975). 
 2
arrest…, innocent and guilty alike…may find the situation so intimidating that they may 
choose to stand mute."6
         This fundamental premise, however, is under attack in the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Those courts have proclaimed the 
novel doctrine that a person's mere failure to say anything when being placed under arrest 
allows an inference of guilt. A striking example of testimony held to give rise to such an 
inference is set out in a decision of the Eighth Circuit. The testimony begins with an 
arresting officer's statement that he told the defendant he was under arrest "for suspicion 
of narcotics."7
[Prosecutor]: What was [the defendant]'s reaction when you placed him in 
custody? 
[Officer]: There really wasn't a reaction. 
[Prosecutor]. Was he angry? 
[Officer]: No, sir. 
[Prosecutor]: Was he surprised? 
[Officer]: No, sir. 
[Prosecutor]: Did he become combative? 
[Officer]: No, sir. 
[Prosecutor]: Did he say anything to you? 
[Officer]: No, sir. 
[Prosecutor]: Did he do anything when you put the handcuffs on him? 
[Officer]: No, sir.[8] 
 
 If such evidence, in fact, is permitted to allow an inference of guilt, then, as a 
judge of the District of Columbia Circuit has trenchantly observed: 
an arrested but not Miranda-ized defendant would be faced with two courses of 
conduct: he could make a voluntary utterance, which could be used against him; or 
he could stand silent, which could be used against him….[9] 
                                                 
6 Id. at 177 
7 United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1109 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 115 
(2006). 
8 Id.  
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This article will demonstrate that imputing guilt from a defendant's failure to speak when 
arrested is incompatible with constitutional and Common Law protections against compelled 
self-incrimination. 
         Part II will briefly sketch the historical development of those protections over a period 
of more than five centuries. Part III will examine the evidentiary principle of tacit admission 
which sometimes conflicted with the Common Law's recognition that a defendant is entitled 
to be silent after arrest. Part IV will address the doctrines of Doyle v. Ohio10 and Fletcher v. 
Weir,11 regarding use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment. Part V will 
explain how the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have misused those doctrines to 
fashion a rule imputing guilt from silence, contrary to the principles of the Fifth Amendment. 
Part VI will explain why imputation of guilt from silence represents a novel and dangerous 
departure from Common Law and constitutional principles. 
 
II. Historical Background. 
         The medieval English Common Law rejected any compulsion on a criminal defendant 
to submit to any sort of interrogation12 or to confess to the charged offense.13
                                                                                                                                                 
9 United States v. Moore, 110 F.3d 99, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (on appellee's suggestion for 
a rehearing en banc) (Sentelle, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
10 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
11 455 U.S. 603 (1982). 
12 See 4 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 84, no. 46 (1415) (Commons protest to King Henry 
V against practice of Chancery in subpoenaing defendants "against the form of the 
common law of your Kingdom" ["encountre la fourme de la commune ley de vostre 
Roialme"] to be inquired of by "examination and oath…according to the form of civil law 
and canon law, in subversion of your common law." ["examination et serement…, solonc 
la fourme de ley cyvle et ley de Seinte Esglise, en subvercion de vostre commune ley"]); 
D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF 
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         Therefore, the Committal Statute of 1555 (2&3 Philip & Mary, c. 10) represented a 
seismic shift in English criminal procedure. It required a justice of the peace to "take the 
examination of [the] Prisoner…of the fact and circumstance" of the alleged crime.14 The 
magnitude of this change is evidenced in the 1582 Eirenarcha of William Lambarde,15 a 
standard work on the functions and duties of a justice of the peace. Lambarde, a legal scholar 
of enormous authority,16 refers to a confession resulting from a justice of the peace's 
                                                                                                                                                 
CHANCERY 43-44 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1890). See also JAMES F. 
BALDWIN, THE KING'S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 296-298 (1913) 
(comparing practice of Common Law, as to which "[n]othing…was more 
antagonistic…than to require a man…to incriminate himself," with the "inquisitorial 
examination" procedure derived from the ecclesiastical courts and followed by the King's 
Council and in Star Chamber). 
13 See William Staunford, LES PLEES DEL CORON, ch. 51, fol. 142 (photo. reprint 1971) 
(n.p., Richard Tottell 1557) (judge must not accept or record confession he perceives to 
be product of "fear, menace, or duress" ["pauour, manace, ou dures"]), citing a case 
reported in  LIBER ASSISSARUM, anno 27, no. 40 (1353), printed in LE LIVRE DES ASSISES 
137 (photo. reprint 1981) (London, George Sawbridge et al. 1679), in which the assize 
judges did not accept the confession of a woman charged with having stolen bread who 
claimed to have done so at the command of her husband. See also FERDINANDO PULTON, 
DE PACE REGIS ET REGNI fol. 184 (photo. reprint 1973) (London, Companie of Stationers 
1609) (confession must "procede freely and of [offendour's] owne good will, without 
menace, threats, rigor, or other extreamities"), citing the same case from the Liber 
Assissarum. 
    The Treasons Act of 1547 provided that one confessing to treason had to do so 
"willingly without violence." 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, §22. This statute "may be regarded as a 
collateral antecedent of the involuntary confession rule." Lawrence Herman, The 
Unexplained Relationship Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the 
Involuntary Confession Rule (pt.1), 53 OHIO ST. L. J. 101, 115 (1992). 
14 The Bail Statute of the preceding regnal year (1&2 Philip & Mary c.13) required a 
justice of the peace to "take the examination" of a prisoner before admitting the prisoner 
to bail. The Marian statutes are exhaustively analyzed in JOHN H. LANGBEIN, 
PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 5-20 (1974). 
15 William Lambard, EIRENARCHA (photo. reprint 1972) (London, Ra. Newbery & H. 
Bynneman 1581). The year of publication was 1582 by modern reckoning, the dating of a 
new year then having begun on March 25. See B.H. Putnam, The Earliest Form of 
Lambard's 'Eirenarcha' and a Kent Wage Assessment of 1563, 41 ENG. HIST. REV. 260, 
266 n.7 (1926). 
16 See P.R. Glazebrook, Introduction to WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA OR THE OFFICE 
OF JUSTICES OF PEACE 3, 3-4, 9-11 (P.R. Glazebrook ed. 1972); Wilfrid Prest, William 
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examination of a prisoner as per se "forced."17 Elsewhere in his treatise, Lambarde explicitly 
characterizes the 1555 statute's provision for formal questioning of a defendant in custody as 
a radical departure from the protection of the Common Law: 
There [in 2&3 Philip & Mary c. 10 (1555)18] also you may see (if I bee not 
deceived) the time when the examination of the Felon himselfe, was first 
warranted by our Law. For at the Common Lawe, his faulte was not to bee 
wrong out of himself  but rather to be proved by others.[19] 
         
           In the second, 1588, edition of Eirenarcha,20 Lambarde adds to this passage the 
maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere (no one is held to betray himself),21 but he puts it in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lambarde, Elizabethan Law Reform, and Early Stuart Politics, 14 J. BRIT. STUD. 464, 
464-466 (1995); James D. Alsop & Wesley M. Stevens, William Lambarde and the 
Elizabethan Polity, 8 STUD. MEDIEVAL & RENAISSANCE HIST. (n.s.) 231, 235-236 (1986); 
RETHA M. WARNICKE, WILLIAM LAMBARDE: ELIZABETHAN ANTIQUARY 1536-1601, at 
70-71, 140-141 (1973). 
17 "The forced Confession, whereof I spake, is that which the Justices do wring out of the 
partie by the Examination of him, in such cases wherein it is permitted." LAMBARD, 
supra note 15 at 427. 
18 For the statutory reference, see LAMBARD, supra note 15 at 205-206. 
19 LAMBARD, supra note 15 at 208-209. Lambarde cites no authority for this conclusion, 
but modern scholarship demonstrates its essential accuracy. JOHN G. BELLAMY, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND TUDOR ENGLAND 25-26, 30-31 
(1984). 
20 WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA (London, Ralph Newbery, 2d ed. 1588). 
21 The nemo tenetur maxim entered into English legal parlance in the decade of the 
1580's. It appears in slightly corrupted form ("nullus" in place of "nemo" and "perdere" in 
place of "prodere" in Richard Crompton's 1584 revision of Anthony Fitzherbert's treatise 
on the justices of the peace: "One is not to be examined on his oath about a matter which 
sounds to his reproach, et nullus tenetur seipsum perdere, as that he committed such 
felony, or that he was a perjurer, or such like etc. for the law presumes that one does not 
want to discredit or accuse himself in such a case." ("Home ne serra examine sur son 
serement de chose que sounde a son reproche, et nullus tenetur seipsum perdere, come le 
quel il fist tiel felony, ou le que il fuit periure, ou tiel semble etc. car le ley intend que 
home ne voile luy mesme discrediter ou accuser in tiel case.") ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, 
LOFFICE ET AUCTHORITIE DE JUSTICES DE PEACE fol. 152 (photo. reprint 1972) (London, 
Richard Tottell, R. Crompton rev. 1584). See M.R.T. Macnair, The Early Development of 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 66, 70 & n.24 
(1990) (citing this source and observing that maxim also appears in canon law sources). 
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the past tense, perhaps indicating the magnitude of the change in criminal procedure 
occasioned by the Marian legislation.22
          The nemo tenetur maxim thereafter became the standard shorthand expression for the 
principle against compelled self-incrimination.23 It informed the Common Law of the newly 
independent American states,24 the Fifth Amendment,25 and the cognate provisions of state 
constitutions.26  
         As Lambarde, however, observed, the Marian procedure of pre-trial examination of 
defendants in custody largely nullified their rights to be silent.27 This was equally true in the 
American colonies where that procedure was in force.28
                                                                                                                                                 
     The nemo tenetur maxim is ultimately derived not from the English Common Law but 
from continental European civil and canon law sources, collectively styled the ius 
commune. See R.H. Helmholtz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The 
Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U.L.REV. 962, 964 & n.12, 967 & nn. 26, 27 
(1990); R.H. Helmholtz, The Privilege and the Ius Commune: The Middle Ages to the 
Seventeenth Century, in R. H. HELMHOLTZ ET AL, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 17, 17-18 (1997). 
22 "Here [in 2&3 Philip & Mary c.10] you may see (if I be not deceived) when the 
examination of a Felon began first to be warranted amongst us. For at the common Law, 
Nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum, and then his fault was not to be wrung out of himselfe, 
but rather to be discovered by other meanes and men." LAMBARD, supra note 20, at 213. 
Compare the 1582 text accompanying note 15, supra. 
23 Sollom Emlyn, Preface to 1 STATE TRIALS (2d. ed.) XXV (London, R.Bagshaw 1809),              
(1730), quoted in LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 327 
(paperback ed. 1999) (1968) ("In other countries, Racks and Instruments of Torture are 
applied to force from the Prisoner a Confession, sometimes of more than is true; but this 
is a practice which Englishmen are happily unacquainted with, enjoying the benefit of 
that just and reasonable Maxim, nemo tenetur accusare seipsum"). 
24 See id. at 428-430. 
25 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 596 (1897). 
26 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896). See Eben Moglen, The Privilege in 
British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in HELMHOLTZ ET 
AL., supra note 21, at 109, 135-136. 
27 LEVY, supra note 23, at 325. 
28 Moglen, supra note 26, at 114-117. 
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         But the principle of a right to silence remained alive. It is manifest in the bar against 
examining defendants under oath29 and in the exclusion from evidence of involuntary 
confessions.30 In addition, the historical sources show that at least some examining 
magistrates followed a practice of advising defendants of their right to remain silent.31
         A defendant's right not to respond to an official accusation of criminal conduct, 
however limited that right may have been at times as a practical matter, is anchored in over 
five centuries of Anglo-American legal tradition. Has this right ever been so attenuated that a 
defendant's mere silence upon arrest can give rise to an inference of guilt? 
 
III. "Qui tacet." 
         The exploration of this question involves consideration of a Common Law evidentiary 
rule of "tacit" or "adoptive" admissions. This rule is derived from the canonical maxim qui 
                                                 
29 LEVY, supra note 23, at 325. Compare the 1415 protest of the Commons to King Henry 
V quoted supra note 12. 
30 LEVY, supra note 23, at 326. See also id. at 495-497 n. 43 (disputing Wigmore's view 
that privilege against self-incrimination and bar on involuntary confessions are wholly 
separate rules); Herman, supra note 13, at 176-189 (same); LEONARD MACNALLY, THE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 41-42 (photo. reprint 2007) (London, J. 
Butterworth 1802) (before confession of prisoner made on examination by justice of the 
peace may be read in evidence, there must be testimony that it was "made freely, without 
any menace or terror, or any species of undue influence imposed upon the prisoner"), 
citing MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 284 (photo. reprint 1971 
(before 1676) (London, E. Nutt et al., 1736) 
31 The Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), an outspoken opponent of 
the privilege against self-incrimination (see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 392 
[1911] [McKenna, J., dissenting]), in addressing the Marian statutes providing for 
examination of prisoners (see supra note 14 and accompanying text) wrote 
disapprovingly that "[i]f the magistrate…wishes to make a parade of clemency, or show 
partial favour to the accused, he follows the rule of the common law, and even tells the 
prisoner to be on his guard, and to say nothing which may turn to his disadvantage." 
JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 242 (London, J.W. Paget 1825). 
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tacet consentire videtur (one who is silent seems to consent).32 In criminal cases, this rule 
exists in tension with the principle of nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. It allows an inference of 
guilt to attach to a person who remains silent in the presence of a statement imputing guilt to 
him of a particular crime.33 By remaining silent upon hearing the accusatory statement, the 
person is said to "adopt" the statement. By failing to speak up and deny it, the defendant 
makes it his or her own. This is a venerable rule.34
        "The tacit admission rule has during the years been accepted by every court, state and 
federal, with few exceptions."35 Its validity, as a matter of common sense, is obvious, but 
only in circumstances where a denial of the accusation would be natural. An influential 
nineteenth-century treatise writer states this reservation succinctly: 
                                                 
32 Boniface VIII, Liber Sext, Decretalium, lib. 5, tit. 12, de regulis iuris, reg. 43 (1298) 
("Qui tacet, consentire videtur"). The eighty-eight regulae of the Sext are the source of 
numerous Latin maxims used by English lawyers, and most of them are derived from 
regulae collected in the corresponding title of Justinian's Digest. See PETER STEIN, 
REGULAE  IURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS 149, 155 (1966). The "qui 
tacet" regula of the Sext is obviously traceable to its more nuanced counterpart in Dig. 
50, 17, 142 (533 C.E.) (Paulus, Ad Edictum 50) ("Qui tacet, non utique fatetur: sed tamen 
verum est eum non negare" ["One who is silent at least does not confess, but 
nevertheless, it is true he does not deny."]) Paulus was a jurist of the early third century 
C.E. whose "reputation in later times and…influence were immense." H.F. JOLOWICZ & 
BARRY NICHOLS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 392 (3d ed. 
1972). 
33 For American cases specifically quoting the maxim qui tacet consentire videtur, see 
Packer v. United States, 106 F. 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1901); Caldwell v. State, 282 Ala. 713, 
718 (1968); Campbell v. State, 55 Ala. 80, 84 (1876); Johnson v. State, 151 Ga. 21, 24-25 
(1921); People v. Kozlowski, 368 Ill. 124, 128 (1938); McKee v. People, 36 N.Y. 113, 
116 (1867); State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 138 (1903); State v. Sudduth, 74 S.C. 498, 500 
(1906). 
34 "If A., when in B.'s presence and hearing, makes statements which B. listens to in 
silence, interposing no objection, A.'s statements may be put in evidence against B., 
whenever B.'s silence is of such a nature as to lead to the inference of assent." FRANCIS 
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES §679, at 581 
(Philadelphia, Kay & Bro., 8th ed. 1880), citing four English and thirty-six American 
cases. "Statements silently acquiesced in may be treated as admissions." Id. 
35 Caldwell v. State, 282 Ala. 713, 719 (1968). 
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[T]o affect one person with the statements of others, on the ground of his implied 
admission of their truth by silent acquiescence, it is not enough that they were made 
in his presence, or even to himself, by parties interested, but they must also have 
been made on an occasion when a reply from him might be properly expected.[36] 
 
 
Whether it would be "unnatural" for a defendant to remain silent in the face of an 
accusatory statement made in the defendant's  presence and hearing when he or she is 
under arrest has historically been a controversial question. In an early and seminal case 
followed in many jurisdictions, Massachusetts adopted a per se rule that the silence of an 
arrested defendant in the face of an accusatory remark cannot be the basis for an 
inference that the defendant has adopted the accusation and, thereby, made it the 
defendant's own. In Commonwealth v. Kenney,37 the defendant was charged with theft. 
The trial judge admitted evidence that a town watchman , having Kenney in custody, said 
in the defendant's presence, "Here is a man that has been robbing a man," and that the 
defendant said nothing in response.38 A while later, the purported victim of the robbery 
appeared where the defendant was held under arrest and, seeing a bag he claimed had 
been taken from him, said in the hearing of Kenney, "Here is the bag." Kenney again 
remained silent.39 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an opinion 
written by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, 40 granted a new trial. It distinguished situations 
                                                 
36 2 JOHN P. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 527 (London, William 
Maxwell & Son 1878). 
37 53 Mass. 235 (1847). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 235-236. 
40 Shaw was one of the most eminent nineteenth century American jurists. "No other state 
judge through his opinions alone had so great an influence on the course of American 
law." LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 3 
(paperback ed. 1967) (1957). 
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where an arrested defendant stands mute in the face of charges from those scenarios 
where a person not in custody remains silent in the presence of accusatory remarks. "In 
some cases, where a similar declaration is made in one's hearing, and he makes no reply, 
it may be a tacit admission of the facts,"41 provided the person hears, understands, and is 
at liberty to reply to the accusations. But where a defendant is under arrest, the 
defendant's silence is not to be taken as an implicit admission of the truth of the 
accusations made in his presence.  
 
The declaration made by the officer, who first brought the defendant to the watch 
house, he certainly had no occasion to reply to. The subsequent statement, if made 
in the hearing of the defendant, (of which we think there was evidence,) was made 
whilst he was under arrest, and in the custody of persons having official authority. 
They were made, by an excited, complaining party, to such officers, who were 
just putting him into confinement. If not strictly an official complaint to the 
officers of the law, it was a proceeding very similar to it, and he might well 
suppose that he had no right to say any thing until regularly called upon to 
answer.[42] 
 
Other states adopted the Massachusetts's per se rule barring any inference of guilt 
from an arrested defendant's standing mute before accusations.43 In New York, Chief 
                                                 
41 53 Mass. at 237. 
42 Id. at 238. The Massachusetts court framed the rule succinctly in Commonwealth v. 
McDermott, 123 Mass. 440, 441 (1877) ("The defendant…, while held in custody, had a 
right to keep silence as to the crime with which he was charged, and all circumstances 
connected with it, and was not called upon to reply to or contradict any statements made 
in his hearing"). 
43 See State v. Weaver, 57 Iowa 730, 732 (1882) (where one is under arrest, charged with 
a crime, his mere silence and failure to deny statements made in his presence tending to 
criminate him, cannot be interpreted as an admission of the truth of such statements); 
State v. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919, 921 (1882) (mere silence, while a party is held in 
custody under a criminal charge, affords no inference whatever of acquiescence in 
statements of others made in his presence. He has the undoubted right to keep silence as 
to the crime with which he is charged, and is not called upon to reply to or contradict 
such statements; statements so made are not admissible against the prisoner, because they 
 11
Justice Roscoe Pound, writing for the court in People v. Rutigliano44, expressly adopting 
the Massachusetts rule, characterized it as "a wise rule."45  
Among commentators, Wharton favored the rule: 
nor can silence, where a party in under arrest, be used as sustaining the hypothesis 
of acquiescence.46
 
                                                                                                                                                 
do not even tend to support the hypothesis of acquiescence); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 
100 Ky. 239, 261 (1896) (not incumbent upon the arrested defendant to speak at all; "he 
had the right to remain silent when charged with a crime, and guilt is not to be imputed to 
him by reason of that silence."); People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 600, 613 (1902) (silence of 
a defendant standing mute cannot be construed as an admission, because he was then 
under arrest and not called upon to speak or deny an accusation); State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 
131, 136-137 (1903) (arrested defendant has right and privilege to remain silent; fact that 
he does so ought not to be allowed to raise any inference against him ); Ellis v. State, 8 
Okla. Crim. 522, 524 (1913) (if it be admitted that, while a person is under arrest, his 
failure to reply to statements made in his presence can be construed as an admission of 
the truthfulness of such statements, then the state would be able to do indirectly what the 
Constitution expressly provides it shall not do directly); State v. Higgins, 321 Mo. 570, 
576 (1928) (while a defendant is in custody or under arrest, statements of a third party, 
made in his presence, and not denied, are inadmissible at the trial); Diblee v. State, 202 
Ind. 571, 579 (1931) (statements made by complaining witnesses and third persons in the 
presence and hearing of the one accused of a crime are not competent evidence from 
which a jury might draw the inference that the accused, by his silence after the statement 
was made, admitted the facts so stated to be true, if the accused was at that time under 
arrest); Weathered v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. App. 514, 523 (1936) (accused has a right to 
keep silent when arrested, and the fact of such silence may not be brought out by the 
State either in testimony or in argument as a guilty circumstance); State v. McKenzie, 
184 Wash. 32, 37-40 (1935) (agreeing with authorities adopting the per se rule);Territory 
v. Corum, 34 Haw. 167, 174-181(1937) (approving authorities adopting per se rule); 
State v. Bowdry, 346 Mo. 1090, 1096 (1940) (silence of an accused while under arrest is 
not admissible in evidence against him as he is then under no duty to make any 
statement); State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 329 (1953) (agreeing with authorities holding 
that mere fact of arrest is sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of the accused's failure 
to deny accusatory statements then made in his presence). See also Henry S. Hilles, Jr., 
Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210, 254 n.278 (1963) (collecting 
cases adopting the Massachusetts rule). 
44 261 N.Y. 103 (1933). 
45 Id. at 106. 
46 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §680, at 546 (Philadelphia, 
Kay & Bro., 8th ed. 1880). 
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Similarly, Bishop held the view that an arrested defendant's silence in the presence of an 
accusation could not raise an inference of guilt.47  
 Nonetheless, authorities continued to be in conflict over the issue. Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeal generally barred the use of an arrested defendant's silence as proof of 
guilt.48 Many state jurisdictions made no hard-and-fast rule on the subject.  Although 
wary of the dangers of such evidence, they left the resolution of the matter to the general 
principles applicable to tacit admissions, carving out no specific exception for silence 
under arrest.49 Wigmore agreed with this approach, believing  that "the better rule would 
                                                 
47 JOEL P.BISHOP, 2 NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §1253, at 1072 (2d ed. 1913). See also 
H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §123 ( Indianapolis 
& Kansas City, Bowen-Merrill Co. 1898), at 155-156 (citing state cases holding arrest 
excludes any inference that silence is acquiescence in others' statements). 
48 See McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928) (after arrest defendant 
has right to say nothing in response to accusatory statement and no derogatory inference 
may be drawn from silence); Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41, 43 (10th Cir. 1936) 
(arrested defendant's failure to deny statements of others made in his presence not 
admissible);  United States v. LoBiondo, 135 F.2d 130, 131 (2d Cir. 1943) (arrested 
defendant's failure to respond to accusatory statements inadmissible); Helton v. United 
States, 221 F.2d 338, 341-342 (5th Cir. 1955) (rejecting prosecution's attempt to convict 
arrested defendant by his silence); Fagundes v. United States,  340 F.2d 673, 677 (1st Cir. 
1965) (jury may not draw adverse inference from defendant's silence in face of 
accusation because right to silence at arrest akin to right to decline to testify). But see 
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1895) (defendant's  confession by tacit 
admission not involuntary merely because he was in custody); Dickerson v. United 
States, 65 F.2d 824, 826-827 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (upholding against voluntariness objection 
admission of arrested defendant's silence in face of co-defendant's confession); Rocchia 
v. United States, 78 F.2d 966, 972 (9th Cir. 1935) (arrested defendant's failure to reply to 
accusation that he tried to bribe his way out of custody admissible as exception to 
ordinary rule that "a defendant under arrest is entitled to remain silent, notwithstanding 
statements by the arresting officers in his presence, and his silence should not be 
construed against him"). 
49 See Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 628, 630, 631 (1881) (arrested defendant's silence in 
face of co-defendant's statement implicating defendant admissible); Ackerson v. State, 
124 Ill. 563, 571-573 (1888) (defendant's post-arrest silence in face of complainant's 
identification of him as robber admissible); Green v. State, 97 Tenn. 50, 66 (1896) (fact 
that a person charged with a crime is under arrest does not render silence inadmissible); 
Raymond v. State, 154 Ala. 1, 2-3 (1908) (mere fact that defendant was under arrest does 
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seem to allow some flexibility"50 with respect to making an inference of guilt from the 
silence of a person under arrest who is faced with an accusatory statement.51
 The Common Law debate over "tacit admissions" expanded to include 
constitutional considerations when, in 1964, the Supreme Court made the Fifth 
Amendment applicable to the States in Malloy v. Hogan52 and safeguarded the privilige 
two years later in Miranda v. Arizona.53 Promptly thereafter, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court abandoned its prior "tacit admission" rule in post-arrest circumstances. 54 In 
Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 55 it held inadmissible an arrested defendant's failure to 
                                                                                                                                                 
not make his silence inadmissible as tacit admission of larceny complainant's accusation 
made in his presence); State v. Booker, 68 W.Va. 8, 9-10 (1910) (silence of an arrested 
defendant in face of accusatory statement admissible, if an innocent person would have 
made a denial); People v. Byrne, 160 Cal. 217, 234-237 (1911) (defendant's silence in 
face of accusatory statement made in his presence implicating him in murder admissible); 
People v. Courtney, 178 Mich. 137, 150 (1913) (mere fact defendant is in custody does 
not exclude acquiescence in accusatory statement); Diamond v. State, 195 Ind. 285, 291-
292 (1924) (mere fact of arrest does not bar admissibility of defendant's silence in face of 
accusatory statement); State v. Won, 76 Mont. 509, 519 (1926) (jury may infer guilt from 
arrested defendant's silence in face of accusations of murder). 
50 JOHN H. WIGMORE, 2 A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE 
COMMON LAW §1072 (1904), at 1258. Wigmore was a critic of the privilege against self-
incrimination: "Every day, in some court of some city, justice is miscarrying because of 
this extraordinary maxim…, 'nemo tenetur seipsum prodere.'" John H. Wigmore, Nemo 
Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 88 (1892). 
51 See also 1 GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (16th ed.) §197 (Boston, 
Little Brown  1899)), annotated by John H. Wigmore, at 330: "That the accused is in 
custody when the statements are made to him does not of itself render it unnatural for him 
to deny what he considers false." 
52 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
53 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
54 Pennsylvania had previously formulated its "tacit admission" rule in Commonwealth v. 
Vallone, 347 Pa. 419 (1943): "The rule of evidence is well established that, when a 
statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating in character and 
naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted by the accused although 
he has opportunity to speak, the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it are 
admissible in evidence as an implied admission of the truth of the charges thus made."Id., 
at 421. 
55 424 Pa. 582 (1967). 
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respond to an accusatory statement read to him by the police. The court declared "all 
cases which were decided in Pennsylvania prior to the Malloy decision are no longer 
authoritative if they conflict with the Fifth Amendment…."56  The court pointedly 
criticized its prior rule admitting an arrested defendant's silence:  
[U]nder the [court's earlier] holding, an accusatory statement made in any 
place chosen by the accuser, whether on the street, in the fields, in an alley or 
a dive, if unreplied to, may be used as an engine in court to send the defendant 
to prison or to the electric chair. 
…[T]he rule is founded on a wholly false premise. One can understand how a 
principle of law built on solid rock might incline to slant from the 
perpendicular because of over-heavy superstructure piled on it as it rises 
higher and higher into the realm of hypothesis, but the tacit admission rule has 
no solid foundation whatsoever. It rests on the spongy maxim, so many times 
proved unrealistic, that silence gives consent.[57]  
 
In a 1979 case,58 the Florida Supreme Court observed "[i]t had been the rule in Florida 
that an accusation of crime otherwise excludable as hearsay could be admitted into 
evidence if it was made in the presence of a defendant who remained silent under 
circumstances which naturally and reasonably call for a reply.This is no longer the rule of 
law in Florida, however, since all 'admissions' derived from a defendant's silence in the 
course of a custodial interrogation (as occurred in this case) are absolutely barred from 
the defendant's trial."59 Similarly, Georgia's Supreme Court held "it is reversible error to 
instruct the jury in a criminal case…that silence or acquiescence by a person in police 
custody may amount to an admission (of guilt). Restated, we hold that, in view of 
                                                 
56 Id., at 584-585. 
57 Id. at 586. 
58 State v. Brown, 367 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1979). 
59 Id. 
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Miranda, police interrogation is not such a circumstance as requires an answer or 
denial…."60
 Despite conflicting approaches to the acceptance or rejection of inferences of guilt 
from an arrested defendant's silence, it is important to observe that all the state and 
federal cases, as well as commentators, address situations in which a third party--be it an 
eye-witness, an accomplice, a police officer, or a complainant-- made an accusatory 
statement in which a defendant could possibly acquiesce by his silence. In short, it has 
unanimously been understood that the doctrine of "adoptive admissions" requires there to 
be something to adopt.61
                                                 
60 Howard v. State, 237 Ga. 471, 475 (1976). See also People v. Cockrell, 63 Cal. 2d 659, 
670 (1965) (although arrested defendant made no statement invoking right against self-
incrimination, he had a right to remain silent and no adverse inference could be drawn); 
People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 360-361 (1973) (arrested defendant has Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent even in the face of specific accusation of crime); State 
v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972) (evidential use of tacit admissions of an 
accused offends right against self-incrimination "and is therefore no longer permissible in 
criminal trials within this jurisdiction"). 
61 FRANCIS WHARTON, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §696 
(Philadelphia, Kay & Bro. 1874), at 614: "[W]here a man at full liberty to speak, and, not 
in the course of a judicial inquiry, is charged with a crime, and remains silent, that is, 
makes no denial of the accusation by word or gesture, his silence is a circumstance which 
may be left to the jury"; ARTHUR P.WILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson& Co. 1896), at 128: "The silence of a 
prisoner when accused by a companion of committing the crime for which he is indicted 
is a circumstance, though very slight, for the consideration of the jury"; H.C. UNDERHILL, 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §122 (Indianapolis and Kansas City, 
Bowen-Merrill Co. 1898), at 153: "The silence of the accused as regards statements in 
his hearing which implicate him directly or indirectly may be proved with the 
statements"; SIMON GREENLEAF, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §197 
(Philadelphia, Rees Welsh & Co. 1899), at 314: "And whether it is acquiesence in the 
conduct or in the language of others, it must plainly appear that such conduct was fully 
known, or the language fully understood by the party, before any inference can be drawn 
from his passiveness or silence"; CHARLES C. MOORE, 2 A TREATISE ON FACTS OR THE 
WEIGHT AND VALUE OF EVIDENCE §1162 (1908), at 1300: "Silence of a party when 
statements or accusations touching his own interest are made to him or in his presence 
sometimes supports an inference of his assent to their truth" (emphases added). 
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IV. Impeachment Use of Post-Arrest Silence. 
By three decisions in the mid-twentieth  century, the United States Supreme Court 
guaranteed observation by the States of a state criminal defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. In the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi,62 it held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred use in a state prosecution of a defendant's 
involuntary confession.63 In the 1964 case of Malloy v. Hogan,64 it held the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition of compelled self-incrimination applicable to state 
prosecutions. And in the landmark 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona,65 it declared what 
can fairly be described as a "constitutional code of rules"66 establishing, as an "absolute 
prerequisite"67 to admission in evidence of anything a defendant might say in response to 
custodial interrogation, that the defendant be explicitly warned of four specific rights,68 
beginning with "the right to remain silent."69
 It is important to note that the holding of Miranda "is not an innovation in our 
jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other 
settings."70 It creates  "prophylactic" rules only.71 It makes no change in the content of 
the privilege against self-incrimination, but rather creates a procedure by which a 
                                                 
62 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
63 In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), the Court had held that the 
privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment barred use in a federal 
prosecution of a defendant's involuntary confession. 
64 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
65 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
66 Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 471. 
68 Id. at 479. 
69 Id. at 468. 
70 Id. at 442. 
71 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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defendant in custody is enabled intelligently to exercise it when subjected to police 
interrogation.72
 It is ironic, therefore, that the creation of the prophylactic Miranda procedure has 
led to confusion as to the extent to which the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination protects an arrested defendant's right to silence. The confusion arises from 
two post-Miranda cases turning on the point in time at which a defendant under arrest 
was advised of the Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio73 and Fletcher v. Weir.74  
 In Doyle, the defendants Doyle and Wood were arrested together and charged 
with selling ten pounds of marijuana to an informant.75 They were arrested near the scene 
of the alleged transaction and given Miranda warnings by the arresting officer, Beamer. 
76 They were tried separately, and each testified at his trial that their arrangement with the 
informant had been to buy, not sell, the marijuana and that the informant had "framed" 
them.77 Both Doyle and Wood were extensively cross-examined by the trial prosecutor as 
to why they had not told the "frame up" story to agent Beamer at the time of their 
arrest.78
 The State did not contend that Doyle's and Wood's post-arrest silence could be 
used as evidence of guilt.79 Rather, it sought "only the right to cross-examine a defendant 
                                                 
72 See Marty Skrapka, Comment, Silence Should Be Golden: A Case Against the Use of a 
Defendant's Post-Arrest Pre-Miranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 
357, 384, 392, 397 (2006) 
73 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
74 455 U.S. 603 (1982). 
75 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 611. 
76 Id. at 612. 
77 Id. at 611, 613. 
78 Id. at 613-614 n.5. 
79 Id. at 617. 
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as to post-arrest silence for the limited purpose of impeachment."80 The Supreme Court, 
however, held that the use for impeachment purposes of Doyle's and Wood's silence, "at 
the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."81
 The Doyle court reached its Fourteenth Amendment due process holding on two 
distinct grounds. The first followed the Court's earlier opinion in United States v. Hale.82
As in Hale, the Court held that the giving of Miranda warnings to a defendant rendered 
his subsequent silence not necessarily inconsistent with his exculpatory trial testimony.83 
After the receipt of Miranda warnings, a defendant's silence is "insolubly ambiguous" 
because it "may be nothing more than…exercise of these Miranda rights."84
 The second ground of the Doyle due process holding was that it would be 
"fundamentally unfair" to impeach a defendant's testimony with his pretrial silence after 
receipt of Miranda warnings, because the warnings themselves convey implicit assurance 
that "silence will carry no penalty."85 This ground was based on the concurring opinion 
of Justice White in Hale.86
 In Fletcher v. Weir, decided by the Supreme Court six years after Doyle, the 
defendant had been convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of one Buchanan.87 
At trial, he testified in his own defense and claimed that the stabbing had been both 
                                                 
80 Id. at 616. 
81 Id. at 619. 
82 422 U.S. 171 (1975). 
83 Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617; Hale, 422 U.S. at 177-180. 
84 Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617. 
85 Id. at 618. 
86 Id. at 618-619; Hale, 422 U.S. at 182-183 (White, J., concurring). 
87 Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. at 603-604. 
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accidental and the result of self-defense.88 The trial prosecutor impeached him in cross-
examination with his failure to advance his exculpatory explanation to the arresting 
officers.89
 The difference between Weir and Doyle was that the record did not indicate that 
Weir had received Miranda warnings before remaining silent immediately after his 
arrest.90 The Supreme Court found the difference significant.91 It stated that in several 
post-Doyle cases, it had "explained Doyle as a case where the government had induced 
silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against 
him."92 Because no such "affirmative assurances" had been give to Weir, the Court held 
that cross-examination of him as to his post-arrest silence did not violate due process.93
 Both the Doyle and Weir decisions invite confusion as to the limits of their 
holdings. This is so because neither case explains the difference between substantive 
evidence and evidence admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment of a witness. 
The difference is obliquely referred to in Doyle94 and omitted entirely in Weir. 
 The difference between substantive evidence and impeachment evidence is 
critical in the context of a criminal case. Substantive evidence is what a party offers in its 
                                                 
88 Id. at 603. 
89 Id. at 603-604. 
90 Id. at 605. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 606, citing Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552,561 (1980), Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-240 (1980), and Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-
408 (1980). 
93 Weir, 455 U.S. at 607. The Court left it to the States to determine under their own rules 
of evidence whether such post-arrest but pre-Miranda silence is usable for impeachment. 
Id. 
94 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 616-617 (statement "inadmissible as evidence of guilt" may 
be admissible for "limited purpose of impeachment"). 
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case-in-chief "for the purpose of proving a fact in issue."95 With respect to the 
government in a criminal case, "substantive evidence" is evidence which goes towards 
proving the defendant's guilt of a crime charged. By contrast, "impeachment evidence" 
introduced by the government cannot be considered by the jury as proof of the 
defendant's guilt. Its use is limited to discrediting ("impeaching") a witness's trial 
testimony and, however indicative of the defendant's guilt it may be to a jury, the jury 
may not treat it as substantive evidence,  that is, as evidence of guilt.96
 Any witness, including a defendant who testifies in the defense case, may be 
impeached by the government with a prior statement by the witness which is inconsistent 
with his or her trial testimony.97 A kind of sub-category of such impeachment evidence is 
impeachment of witnesses by their previous failure to state a fact asserted in their trial 
testimony in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted.98
 That was the kind of "impeachment" the government assayed in cross-
examination of the defendants in Doyle and Weir, by eliciting acknowledgments of the 
respective defendants' post-arrest silence with respect to the exculpatory versions claimed 
in their trial testimony. Neither opinion gives any intimation that pre-Miranda post-arrest 
silence could have been introduced in the government's case-in-chief as evidence of guilt. 
                                                 
95 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979). 
96 The distinction between "substantive" and "impeachment" evidence is 
comprehensively explained and illustrated in Commonwealth  v. Rosa, 412 Mass. 147, 
156-160 (1992). 
97 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 (1971). 
98 3 H. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1042, at 1056 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
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The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Doyle99 is explicit on the point that the use 
of a defendant's post-arrest silence to prove guilt is improper: 
 
[P]ortions of the prosecutor's argument to the jury overstepped permissible 
bounds. In each trial, he commented upon the defendant's silence not only as 
inconsistent with his testimony that he had been "framed," but also as 
inconsistent with the defendant's innocence. Comment on the lack of credibility 
of the defendant is plainly proper; it is not proper, however, for the prosecutor 
to ask the jury to draw a direct inference of guilt from silence--to argue, in 
effect, that silence is inconsistent with innocence….[100] 
 
 
V.  Expansion of the Rule of Fletcher v. Weir.  
Justice Stevens's assumption in Doyle that the prosecution may not invite a direct 
inference of guilt from a defendant's post-arrest silence has been shared by the full Court 
at least from the time that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was 
held applicable to the States. In Malloy v. Hogan,101 the incorporating decision, the Court 
stated that the privilege "guarantees…the right of a person to remain silent unless he 
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty…for 
such silence."102 In Escobedo v. Illinois,103 the Court stated that, when the police accused 
the defendant of murder at the time of the defendant's arrest, the defendant had "an 
                                                 
99 Justice Stevens thought cross-examination of the defendants about their post-Miranda 
silence was proper because there was no evidence that the defendants, in remaining 
silent, were relying on the Miranda warnings. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 620-623 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 633-635 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Examples of such improper invitations at the 
Doyle trials of inferences of guilt from the defendant's silence are collected id. at 634 n. 
12. 
101 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
102 Id. at 8. 
103 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation."104 The Miranda decision 
itself is replete with assumptions that the right of silence exists prior to any attempt to 
interrogate a person in custody. 105
 Along with the Court, the American public shared the same assumption. Long 
before the Miranda decision, it was "common knowledge" that a person under arrest "has 
a right to say nothing."106 It became a "popular notion, buttressed by television and radio 
programs, that arrested persons have the right to remain silent and that 'anything you say 
may be used against you.'"107
 Despite the well-founded understanding that an arrested person's silence is an 
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, three federal Courts of Appeals have 
rejected it. 
 In United States v. Love,108 a Georgia farm was the suspected primary landing site 
for a major drug smuggling operation.109 Law enforcement agents had the farm under 
surveillance when the defendants Love and Youngblood drove to it and parked in the 
                                                 
104 Id. at 485. The Court took specific note of the distinction between "interrogation" and 
"accusation." See id. at 485 n.5. 
105 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 465 (arrested person's choice to speak to police is 
"abdication of the constitutional privilege"), 466 (by choosing to remain silent or to 
speak, arrested person "exercise[s] the privilege"), 467 (privilege "protect[s] persons in 
all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being 
compelled to incriminate themselves"), 467-468 (arrested person possesses privilege 
prior to being made "aware" of it by warning), 468 (interrogator's imprecation that 
arrested person's "silence in the face of accusation is itself damning" rejected), 468 
(arrested person may be "aware" of privilege before being given warning), 478 (arrested 
person's privilege is "jeopardized" when he or she is subjected to questioning), 479 
(arrested person must be "notif[ied]" of right of silence to "protect" privilege). 
106 McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1922). See also Note, Silence as 
Incrimination in Federal Courts, 40 MINN. L. REV. 598, 607 (1956). 
107 Hilles, supra, n.43, at 246. 
108 767 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1985). 
109 Id. at 1057. 
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carport.110 Agent Hill "advised Love that he and Youngblood could leave if they helped 
the officers determine that they were at the farm innocently and were not involved in the 
drug smuggling operation."111 However, Love and Youngblood did not offer any 
explanation for their presence at the farm.112 Other agents arrived and placed them under 
arrest.113
 Love and Youngblood contended on appeal that the trial judge should have 
declared a mistrial after Agent Hill's testimony about their failure, while in custody at the 
farm, to explain their presence there.114 The Fourth Circuit rejected the contention. It 
observed that the Supreme Court in Doyle had held "that testimony concerning a 
defendant's silence 'at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings' is 
inadmissible."115 However, citing Weir, the Fourth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court 
had "subsequently refined its rule in Doyle to permit testimony concerning a defendant's 
silence where the defendant has not 'received any Miranda warnings during the period in 
which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.'"116 The Fourth Circuit concluded: 
 
In this case neither Love nor Youngblood had been given any Miranda 
warnings at the time Agent Hill observed their silence. As a result under 
Doyle and [Weir], Agent Hill's testimony was properly admitted.[117] 
 
                                                 
110 Id. at 1057-1058. 
111 Id. at 1058. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 1058, 1063. 
115 Id. at 1063, quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 619. 
116 Id. at 1063, quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. at 605. 
117 Id. at 1063. 
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 The fallacy in Love is immediately apparent. The decision shows no recognition 
of the distinction, critical to both Doyle and Weir, between evidence used for the limited 
purpose of impeachment of a defendant as a witness and evidence used substantively in 
the government's case to prove the defendant's guilt. Weir provides no support at all for 
substantive use of a defendant's post-arrest silence. 
 In United States v. Rivera,118 the defendant Vila and her three-year old child had 
arrived at Miami International Airport on a flight from Colombia.119 They were traveling 
with Vila's brother-in-law Rivera and her friend Stroud.120 A variety of factors aroused 
Customs Inspector Schor's suspicion of the group and he directed them to a table in an 
inspection area.121 The Eleventh Circuit assumed without deciding that Vila was in 
custody at this time.122 In Vila's presence, Schor punctured the bottom of Stroud's 
suitcase with a screwdriver "and after withdrawing it, noticed a white powder on it which 
was tested as being cocaine."123 Schor testified that Vila and her companions "showed no 
surprise, agitation, or protest while he was probing Stroud's luggage."124 The prosecutor 
deliberately elicited this episode of silence and later highlighted it in closing argument.125
 The Eleventh Circuit held that the prosecutor "was clearly entitled to comment on 
Vila's demeanor…as Stroud's suitcase was being searched."126 Citing Weir,127 it ruled 
that: 
                                                 
118 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991). 
119 Id. at 1565. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1568. 
123 Id. at 1565. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1569. 
126 Id. 
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the government may comment on a defendant's silence when it occurs after 
arrest, but before Miranda warnings are given…[E]ven  if [Vila] was in 
custody at that time, the government could comment on her silence as she 
viewed Schor's inspection of Stroud's suitcase because she had not yet been 
given her Miranda warnings.128
 
 Because Vila had not yet been given the Miranda warnings, the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned, again citing Weir, she had not yet been "given the implicit assurance 
that her silence would not be used against her."129 "Because she had not yet received such 
affirmative assurances when Stroud's suitcase was being searched, the government could 
unquestionably comment on her silence during that phase of the encounter."130
 The flaw in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Rivera is identical to that of the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in Love. Again, there is no judicial awareness that Weir deals 
solely with the impeachment use of an arrested defendant's pre-Miranda silence, not its 
substantive use as evidence of a defendant's guilt. 
 In United States v. Frazier,131 Frazier was driving a U-Haul truck which 
police officers suspected of containing drugs on the basis of its appearance and route of 
travel.132 Trooper Rasgorshek stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation.133 He and other 
officer's searched it with Frazier's consent.134 Behind two mattresses in the back of the 
truck, they discovered boxes containing large plastic bags filled with white pills, believed 
                                                                                                                                                 
127 Id. at 1568 n.11. 
128 Id. at 1568. 
129 Id. at 1568 n.12. 
130 Id. 
131 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 115 (2006). 
132 Id. at 1106. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1106-1107. 
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to be pseudoephedrine.135 Frazier was placed under arrest.136 "Trooper Rasgorshek 
testified that when Frazier was arrested, his reaction was neither angry, surprised, nor 
combative. Frazier did not say anything when the officers told him why he was being 
arrested."137
 In closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury should infer guilt from 
Frazier's silence at the time of his arrest.138 On appeal, Frazier argued that "because the 
introduction of his silence was not for impeachment purposes, it was improper."139 He 
contended that the eliciting of testimony about his post-arrest silence in the government's 
case-in-chief "violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."140
 Unlike the courts in Love and Rivera, the Eighth Circuit in Frazier did not 
fail to observe the distinction between evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence 
offered for the limited purpose of impeachment of the defendant as a witness and the 
same evidence offered as substantive proof of guilt in the government's case-in-chief. It 
correctly saw that Frazier's  case involved the substantive use of his post-arrest pre-
Miranda silence and, consequently, did not involve the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process principles of Doyle and Weir governing impeachment of a defendant who 
testifies.141 The issue was whether the government had properly used that silence in its 
case-in-chief as direct proof of guilt.142
                                                 
135 Id at 1107. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. See text accompanying n.8 supra. 
138 Id. at 1109.  
139 Id. at 1110. 
140 Id. at 1109. 
141 Id. at 1110. 
142 Id. at 1109. 
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 The Eighth Circuit resolved the issue against Frazier. First, it quoted a 
statement by Justice Stevens, concurring in a case involving a defendant's pre-arrest 
silence: the "privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is simply irrelevant to a 
citizen's decision to remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak."143 
Then it applied that statement to Frazier's post-arrest pre-Miranda silence: 
 
The crux of our inquiry today is to determine at what point a defendant 
is under "official compulsion to speak" because silence in the face of 
such compulsion constitutes a "statement" for purposes of a Fifth 
Amendment inquiry. 
  
          Does the use of postarrest pre-Miranda silence during the 
government's case-in-chief constitute an impermissible use of an 
accused's coerced incriminating "statement?"….On the facts before us, 
we find no Fifth Amendment violation. 
 
           ….[T]he…issue is whether Frazier was under any compulsion to 
speak at the time of his silence. He was not. Although Frazier was 
under arrest, there was no governmental action at that point inducing 
his silence. Thus he was under no government-imposed compulsion to 
speak. It is not as if Frazier refused to answer questions in the face of 
interrogation. We are speaking in this case only of the defendant's 
silence during and just after his arrest….Therefore, on these facts, the 
use of Frazier's silence in the government's case-in-chief as evidence 
of guilt did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights….[144] 
 
 This rationale contains two false assumptions. First, there is no rule of law 
that postpones the protection of an arrested defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination until he or she is under "official compulsion to speak," i.e., subjected 
to custodial interrogation by law enforcement authorities. Second, the Eighth 
Circuit is necessarily assuming that the giving of Miranda warnings in itself 
                                                 
143 Id. at 1110, quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
144 Id. at 1110-1111 (emphases original). 
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constitutes an "official compulsion" of an arrested defendant "to speak." On this 
reasoning, the privilege against self-incrimination comes into existence only when 
there is such "compulsion." Consequently, the police can withhold the privilege 
against self-incrimination simply by not advising an arrested person of the 
Miranda warnings. In that case, a person's silence after his or her arrest can be 
used as direct proof of guilt. This turns on its head the privilege that Miranda was 
intended to protect. 
 There is a split among the Circuits on the issue of substantive use of a 
defendant's post-arrest pre-Miranda silence.145 Decisions of the Ninth, District of 
Columbia, and Seventh Circuits hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination is effective at least from the time of arrest.146 The Sixth Circuit 
has reached the same conclusion in the context of a case involving the substantive 
use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence147 A judge of the Eighth Circuit has 
incisively criticized the reasoning of the Frazier case in a subsequent decision,148 
                                                 
145 The Fifth Circuit has retreated from what appeared to be approval, in United States v. 
Garcia-Gil, 133 Fed. Appx. 102, 107-108 & n.6, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 922 (2005), of the 
use of a defendant’s post-arrest pre-Miranda silence (there, that Garcia-Gil, upon being 
informed that he was under arrest, did not ask “what he was under arrest for”) as 
substantive evidence of guilt.  However, Garcia-Gil was an unpublished and non-
precedential opinion, id. at 103 n.*, and in United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750 (5th 
Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit, observing the split among Circuits on the issue, id. at 758, 
and leaving the issue undecided, id. at 759, “expressly decline[d] to endorse the reasoning 
of the non-precedential opinion in Garcia-Gil.”  Salinas, supra at 758 n.8. 
146 See United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1028-1030 (9th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Moore, 104 F. 3d 377, 384-389 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 321-324 (7th Cir. 1991). 
147 See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 284 (6th Cir. 2000). 
148 United States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 845 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 
U.S. 1056 (2006) (Lay, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
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emphasizing that  "[s]tanding mute" invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination.149
 State courts have reached similar conclusions on policy grounds or in 
construing cognate provisions of their state constitutions.150
 
VI.  An Inference of Guilt from Pure Silence.  
 At first sight, it may seem that the inference of guilt from post-arrest 
silence, as exemplified by the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit cases, is a 
modern application of the ancient maxim qui tacet consentire videtur. But a close 
consideration of the facts of these cases will show that the predicate for the 
maxim's application is wholly lacking. The maxim posits that there is an 
accusatory statement that the defendant by silence effectively adopts, thereby 
making it his or her own statement. 
                                                 
149 Id. at 846 (Lay, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
150 See Coleman v. State, 111 Nev. 657, 663-664 (1995) (declining on policy grounds to 
distinguish between post-arrest post-Miranda silence and and post-arrest pre-Miranda 
silence); Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Alaska App. 1984) (use of defendant's 
post-arrest silence barred under state constitution); State v. Davis, 38 Wash. App. 600, 
606 (1984) (use of defendant's post-arrest silence, regardless of whether it followed 
Miranda warnings, barred by state constitution); People v. Jacobs, 158 Cal. App.3d 740, 
750 (1984) (questioning defendant at trial about his silence during and after arrest 
violated state constitution); Commonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 584 (1982) (declining 
to hold, under state constitution, that the existence of Miranda warnings, or their absence, 
affects a person's legitimate expectation not to be penalized for exercising the right to 
remain silent); Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (1978) (any comment upon an 
accused's exercise of his right of silence, whether by interrogation of the accused himself, 
or by interrogation of others, inherently is prejudicial under state constitution); People v. 
Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 357, 361 (1973) (("If silence in the face of specific accusation may 
not be used, it would be a strange doctrine indeed that would permit silence absent such 
an accusation to be used as evidence of guilt[,]" citing state constitution). 
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 The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits cases, however, address a wholly 
different species of evidence. They attach an inference of guilt to pure silence. 
These cases compel defendants to proclaim their innocence at the moment they are 
taken into custody, or suffer an inference of guilt from their silence. 
 Opponents of the privilege against self-incrimination, like Bentham and 
Wigmore, have contended that it impedes the truth-finding function of the trial. 
Inferences of guilt from post-arrest silence alone, however, do nothing to serve that 
truth-finding function. The Miranda warnings have become, in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's memorable phrase, "part of our national culture."151 As one 
commentator has astutely observed: 
 
If most people are at least generally aware of their right to 
remain silent, it follows that a reasonable person who is aware 
of this right might naturally exercise the right when faced with 
arrest, even before the express warning is given. Thus, the use 
of a criminal defendant's post-arrest silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt is highly questionable, regardless of whether 
the defendant has received the requisite Miranda warnings.[152] 
 
 Nonetheless, the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
allowed the prosecution to invite an inference of guilt from silence without 
foundation in prior law or in common experience. If their doctrine were to 
prevail, "the customary formula of warning should be changed, and the 
                                                 
151 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).  
152 Skrapka, supra n.72 at 358-359. 
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[arrested person] should be told, 'If you say anything, it will be used 
against you. If you do not say anything, that will be used against you.'"153
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928). 
